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Abstract
Effective national leaders throughout history have deliberately developed
grand strategies and successfully implemented them to attain their
political goals, while also integrating and accomplishing economic,
social, defense, and sometimes religious objectives. Not all leaders have
been successful, however, as this process is immensely complex and can
be adversely affected by the actions of other leaders around their region
and the world. It bears examination, then, to determine what factors
contribute to successful grand strategies and why many leaders fail to
reach their stated ends. This article utilizes a historic case study
approach and explores three key areas of grand strategy: universal
principles, Clausewitzian approaches, and indirect approaches. I handle
each separately and in distinct fashion, though some connective tissue
does interlace across sections. Additionally, the unifying argument is that
thoughtful, rational leaders, who weigh the costs and benefits associated
with each course of action available to them, still must heed the truths
embedded in these three sections to attain their objectives. Not doing so
often leads to failure, unrealized goals, and a nation gone awry.
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1The Multiple Faces of Effective 
Grand Strategy
By Bryan N. Groves1
Introduction
Effective national leaders throughout history have deliberately developed 
grand strategies and successfully implemented them to attain their politi-
cal goals, while also integrating and accomplishing economic, social, 
defense, and sometimes religious objectives. Not all leaders have been 
successful, however, as this process is immensely complex and can be 
adversely affected by the actions of other leaders around their region and 
the world. It bears examination, then, to determine what factors contrib-
ute to successful grand strategies and why many leaders fail to reach their 
stated ends. This article utilizes a historic case study approach and 
explores three key areas of grand strategy: universal principles, Clause-
witzian approaches, and indirect approaches. I handle each separately 
and in distinct fashion, though some connective tissue does interlace 
across sections. Additionally, the unifying argument is that thoughtful, 
rational leaders, who weigh the costs and benefits associated with each 
course of action available to them, still must heed the truths embedded in 
these three sections to attain their objectives. Not doing so often leads to 
failure, unrealized goals, and a nation gone awry.
Universal Principles of Flexible Grand Strategy
Grand strategy is the matching of large ends with means.2 Visionary lead-
ership and relevant communication are two universally applicable princi-
ples of grand strategy. Leaders who employ them effectively increase their 
country's likelihood of success. Polybius and Thucydides are key historical 
figures who provide insight into these principles. The terminology each 
used varies, but the concepts and their significance to the development 
and execution of successful grand strategy does not.
Visionary leadership is the fundamental principle necessary for the imple-
mentation of an effective grand strategy. Thucydides and Polybius use 
historical approaches to explain the significance of leadership to grand 
strategy. In his account of Hannibal's campaign across the Alps and the 
ensuing battles between his Carthaginian army and the Roman armies, 
Polybius repeatedly indicates how Hannibal proactively chose the terrain 
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on which he would have an advantage.3 Hannibal also exercised effective 
leadership by balancing mission accomplishment and care for his troops. 
He provided his troops with periodic respites to regain physical and emo-
tional strength, and to scavenge for food.4 This served both to encourage 
his troops and to facilitate the mission of conquering the Roman army 
and acquiring more Roman territory.
In contrast, Alcibiades' influence over the Athenians led them to embark 
on the ill-fated Sicilian Expedition. Alcibiades saw the conquest of Sicily 
as the best means to accomplish Athenian grand strategy and extend their 
influence because it used their strength—sea power.5 The endeavor failed, 
however, because it lacked unity of command.6 The decision led Athens to 
deviate from their grand strategy which had been to focus on Sparta, who 
posed the greatest threat in terms of power and proximity, before extend-
ing their influence further. The deviation proved disastrous for the Athe-
nians and weakened their capability to fight the Spartans. Hannibal's 
actions, when compared with those of Alcibiades, demonstrate the differ-
ence that leadership makes in grand strategic outcomes.
Articulate communication that resonates with and inspires subordinates 
and supporters alike is a second grand strategic principle that transcends 
time and place. People weary from strenuous effort, fearful of daunting 
challenges or threats that lie ahead, or unclear of the difference they can 
make need motivation to complete their tasks. Soldiers are often in these 
circumstances. Athenian, Spartan, Roman, Carthaginian, and contempo-
rary commanders have all recognized this and inspired their troops with 
motivational speeches prior to battle.
Wise leaders wanting to implement a successful grand strategy use com-
munication to inspire, but also to direct. People cannot execute the 
leader's plan nor take ownership of it if they do not understand the ends 
or the general means by which the leader intends to reach the objectives. 
They will not participate wholeheartedly unless it is clear how it is in their 
self interest to do so and to help the team achieve the expressed goals. 
With widespread public support for their grand strategy, leaders can 
mobilize and direct the resources necessary to realize success; without it, 
they will likely fail, even if they have made the proper estimate of the 
enemy's situation and their own.7
The previous discussion indicates the power of domestic communication 
between a leader and his people. Effective intergovernmental communi-
cation is another facet of successful grand strategy. The Debate at Sparta 
and the Melian Dialogue are particularly instructive regarding diplomatic 
communication. In the Debate at Sparta, the Corinthians demanded Spar-
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tan engagement against Athens, arguing that the Spartans had not lived 
up to their commitments to the Allies. The Corinthian argument eventu-
ally convinced Sparta and they became involved in the war.8 During the 
Melian Dialogue the Melians unsuccessfully attempted to sway Athens to 
allow them to remain neutral. The Melians' failed efforts at moral persua-
sion and their refusal to side with Athens resulted in their ruin.9
Competent leadership and clear, persuasive communication are univer-
sally necessary principles of grand strategy. Although the implementation 
of these principles will vary due to different times, regions, organization 
types, or the technology available, abiding by these principles is impor-
tant. Leaders who fail to successfully exercise these principles will not 
achieve their goals. The same can be said of leveraging appropriate means 
to accomplish desired ends. This maxim is at the core of the Clausewitzian 
grand strategic approach.
Grand Strategy—Applying Clausewitz throughout 
History
The Prussian general and strategist Carl von Clausewitz argued that "war 
is merely the continuation of policy by other means."10 By this he meant 
that war is one "instrument"11 available to leaders for accomplishing their 
grand strategic ends, and that political objectives should precede military 
ones.12 Clausewitz also argued that means must match their ends, and a 
leader must not choose ends for which he does not have the means.13 
Phillip II of Spain, Elizabeth I of England, and the Founding Fathers of 
America understood this Clausewitzian "principle"14 to different degrees 
and exercised it to varying levels of success.
Phillip II
Phillip II did not well apply the Clausewitzian concept of matching appro-
priate means to accomplish political ends. Phillip's grand strategy was to 
restore Catholicism to England under his rule and increase the religion's 
influence across Western Europe. Phillip believed God wanted to use him 
to accomplish these goals. He saw himself as having special access to God 
which enabled him to understand God's will better than others. Phillip 
believed his divine connection guaranteed his success and so did not 
make the necessary calculations and preparations to ensure success. He 
did not ensure that his navy had the proper ammunition aboard each ves-
sel to fit their cannons, nor enough of it to successfully defeat the British 
Navy and conquer England. Phillip did not take seriously the logistical 
requirements of food preparation for the journey and did not ensure that 
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commanders' enforced the necessary discipline of eating the oldest food 
first. Instead he impatiently sent his Navy off to war, "in the hope of a mir-
acle,"15 before they had stockpiled enough food.
Phillip's inability to establish an efficient bureaucracy to process the volu-
minous paperwork from his field commanders was another failure that 
prevented the realization of his grand strategy. His micromanagement 
meant that his commanders did not have decentralized control to make 
operational decisions necessary to ensure success. Instead they sought 
guidance from Phillip, but often did not obtain a timely answer due to the 
time lag associated with couriers and from Phillip's inefficient informa-
tion processing. Despite having a more secure financial situation and a 
stronger military than England, these failures and the friction16 caused by 
bad weather and British actions contributed significantly to the rout of his 
Armada by Elizabeth I and her Royal Navy. They also demonstrated that 
while Phillip did subordinate military means to reach his political objec-
tive, he did not use the means necessary to successfully accomplish it.
Elizabeth I
Elizabeth I experienced greater success in her grand strategy than did 
Phillip II because she applied the concepts that Clausewitz wrote about 
years later. Her grand strategy was to strengthen England's position in 
relation to Continental Europe, and to further Protestantism. One way 
she did this was by remaining unmarried and by abstaining from wars 
that did not suit England. By remaining unmarried and childless she was 
able to exercise balance of power diplomacy17 without being drawn into 
wars simply for dynastic reasons. As the leader of a relatively weak power, 
Elizabeth's decision to avoid overstretching her nation was a wise 
approach toward reaching her grand strategic ends.
A second way by which Elizabeth sought to accomplish her grand strategy 
was through decentralized execution, but within guidelines that she set. 
She directed Lord Howard, Sir Drake, and her other commanders to 
"harass"18 the Spanish Armada, waiting for the time when the enemy was 
vulnerable to decisively engage, the point Clausewitz referred to as the 
"culminating point."19 This measure of freedom permitted her command-
ers to develop tactical and operational means to suit her strategic guid-
ance. Operating under this freedom, Drake launched a preemptive raid in 
1587 on the port at Cadiz, destroying enough ships to postpone the Span-
ish invasion by a year.20 The next year Drake and his superior, Lord 
Howard, used fire-ships to terrorize the Spanish fleet and force them out 
of Calais. This served as a turning point that, along with Spanish errors 
and poor weather, led to English victory. Elizabeth's calculated and ratio-
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nal approach toward her grand strategy proved more successful than Phil-
lip's and confirmed that she understood Clausewitz's principle of 
determining her political aim and then matching means to accomplish it.
America's Founding Fathers
America's Founding Fathers understood and applied Clausewitz to their 
grand strategy. Their broad purpose was to see if a government could last 
without the force that a monarch imposes.21 Specifically, they believed the 
best means of doing so was to turn the newly-independent American 
states from a Confederation into a Union and a great power.22 Toward 
these ends they sought economic growth and security, both internal and 
external. A Union with a strong federal government offered the best 
opportunity for success because it provided the greatest protection from 
internal factions23 and from external threats.24 A Union also offered the 
greatest hope for moving America from being a peripheral entity to a cen-
tral power because it would enable Americans to pool the vast resources 
available on the continent. They devised a constitution that addressed the 
weaknesses in the Articles of Confederation and established a framework 
for a stronger central government, capable of protecting all Americans 
and establishing America as a formidable world power. Realizing that 
they could not have the Union and abolish slavery, they made provisions 
for slavery to remain legal for the time being, believing that the most 
important thing was to form the Union; slavery could be addressed later. 
To ensure ratification, Hamilton, Jay, and Madison laid out the reasoning 
for the constitution and the formation of such a Union in the Federalist 
Papers. Later, the Founding Fathers adopted a policy of avoiding entan-
gling alliances25 to avoid engagement in unnecessary wars during Amer-
ica's formative years. These means helped preserve a strong Union and 
contributed to America's rise as a global power. They also demonstrate 
that the Founding Fathers adopted means consistent with their ends and 
subordinated military pursuits to political interests.
Clausewitz remains relevant for statesmen today. Contemporary leaders 
are wise to subordinate military considerations to the political objective 
and to match ends with appropriate means when formulating and execut-
ing their grand strategy. President George H. W. Bush did this during the 
first Gulf War in the early 1990s when he rallied the international com-
munity, formed a coalition, and drove Saddam Hussein from Kuwait—his 
stated political objective—using the requisite military force, but not more 
than was necessary. His son, President George W. Bush, experienced less 
success waging the current Iraq War because he violated Clausewitzian 
concepts. While he generally kept military considerations subject to the 
political aim, he did not always apply appropriate means to reach his 
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political goal. The failure to properly plan for the post-invasion tasks of 
reconstruction and nation building was a classical example of taking "the 
first step without considering the last"26 and led to errors in execution 
and increased instability. As a result, Iraq has proven a painful reminder 
that Clausewitz was right when he harped on the critical importance of 
matching means to ends.
Grand Strategy and the Indirect Approach
As with policies based on Clausewitz, successful national leaders have also 
utilized an indirect approach to accomplish their political objectives.27 
Some practitioners of grand strategy have successfully employed it to 
achieve their aims with lower financial and human costs than via a direct 
approach. The indirect way contributed to a successful grand strategy 
when its practitioners accurately accounted for their domestic situation, 
their relative position in the international arena, and recent technological 
developments.
Both Sun Tzu and B. H. Liddell Hart were theoretical proponents of 
applying indirect approaches to the practice of grand strategy.28 Sun Tzu 
wrote that the best war is the one you do not fight because you win 
through diplomatic means, intelligence operations, or other indirect 
methods.29 Hart, the great British strategist, defined the indirect way as 
an "approach to the main enemy (that) was essentially ... through (their) 
weakness to strength."30 The goal was to pit one's strengths, including a 
variety of resources—even unconventional methods—against an enemy's 
weaknesses, rather than meeting his strengths head on.
Hart thought the primary benefit of utilizing the indirect way was that it 
left a nation better off after a war than before.31 British grand strategy 
during World War I frustrated Hart because it deviated from what he 
understood to be the country's traditional use of the indirect way to win 
wars through mastery of the seas, a colonial empire rich in resources, and 
financial support for continental allies who served as British proxies, 
fighting decisive land battles. When Britain used the indirect way during a 
war, it emerged relatively stronger because it stayed out of the fray and 
allowed others to handle direct engagements and therefore suffer the 
majority of the casualties. Britain did not use the indirect way in WWI and 
was not better off after the war than before.
Successful use of the indirect approach involves more than simply asym-
metrically leveraging assets against a foe. A leader must also have an 
accurate understanding of the domestic and international situations in 
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which he is operating. An improper evaluation of either can lead to fail-
ure. The Athenian leader, Pericles, is one example. Pericles failed to 
understand the adverse impact his grand strategy would have on the 
domestic morale of the Athenian people. Pericles adopted a defensive 
posture in an attempt to demonstrate to the Spartans that Athens was 
invincible and that frequent invasions were futile. Although his grand 
strategy had operational merit, Pericles forgot to account for the emo-
tional reaction of his people upon seeing the Spartans ravage their home-
land. This miscalculation led to the ultimate failure of Pericles' grand 
strategy.
As with Pericles, using an indirect approach does not inevitably lead to 
success, nor does using a direct approach inevitably lead to failure. Han-
nibal experienced tremendous operational success despite using a direct 
approach, capitalizing on superior tactics and intelligence to win decisive 
battles at the time and place of his choosing. In the end, though, he was 
unable to force the Romans to accept his terms of peace. Although it is 
impossible to know for sure whether indirect methods would have been 
more successful, the result of Hannibal's grand strategy illustrate the dif-
ficulty of gaining victory by directly attacking a formidable foe and 
extending one's logistical support over many miles and difficult terrain. 
Napoleon's foray into Russia likewise demonstrated the near impossibil-
ity of such an international undertaking, made even more difficult by an 
enemy utilizing indirect means to further his forces' attrition.
Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt demonstrated a keen under-
standing of the indirect approach as grand strategic practitioners and 
partners during WWII. Churchill accurately recognized that his position 
vis-à-vis the Germans was weak. Because he knew that Britain could not 
win the war on its own, he actively courted the American President to join 
the war effort. The British Prime Minister simultaneously mobilized his 
own limited resources to maintain the fight against Nazi Germany until he 
could win the full support of allies, especially the Americans, and by so 
doing tip the balance in his favor. Meanwhile, Roosevelt utilized the indi-
rect way to move the U.S. toward actual entrance into the war. He incre-
mentally moved America toward war by gradually increasing its material 
support for the Allied cause. From moral support in the Atlantic Charter 
to Lend Lease, Roosevelt supported Churchill but without getting too far 
ahead of his domestic support base. After Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt could 
enter the war with the support of the American people, but he still exer-
cised leadership as a grand strategist, adopting a 'Europe first' approach 
when the country was fixated on Japan.
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In the end, American support enabled Churchill to bridge the time gap 
until America actually entered the war. In the meantime, Churchill's 
emphasis on gaining air superiority enabled Britain to distance itself from 
Germany and survive until American (and Soviet) troops joined the war 
effort. Churchill's ability to envision and shape the big picture by utilizing 
means commensurate with his ends,32 including an indirect approach, 
contributed to his success in navigating English grand strategy.
The post-WWII world also contains several examples of grand strategists 
successfully employing the indirect approach. George Kennan's strategy 
of containment proved to be complementary to the Marshall Plan and a 
successful indirect approach to limiting Soviet influence in Europe during 
the Cold War. President Reagan used increased defense spending, rheto-
ric, and diplomacy as indirect means to cause the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. Although the American military was directly engaged in Desert 
Shield and Desert Storm, Bush Senior successfully employed indirect 
methods by using the UN to build a unified coalition to share the financial 
costs and military involvement in the Persian Gulf War and to increase its 
legitimacy.
In each case these post-WWII grand strategists bridged the gap between 
setting and realizing their political objectives by using indirect methods as 
part of their means. Doing so enabled them to accomplish their goals with 
less loss of life and potentially less financial strain. They were successful 
not just because they used the indirect way, but because they could count 
on the support of their country as they implemented their grand strategy. 
They were also successful because they adapted their grand strategy to the 
technological developments of the nuclear age and, in accordance with 
Clausewitz, used means commensurate with their ends.
Conclusion
President Obama appears to understand that effective grand strategy 
involves weighing priorities. His speech on Afghanistan at West Point last 
December demonstrated a commitment to disrupting, dismantling, and 
defeating al-Qaida in South Asia, yet recognized that U.S. efforts there 
were limited in scope, timeframe, and resources. America (at least under 
his administration), would not subordinate its domestic, diplomatic, and 
economic goals to the unlimited and unending pursuit of al-Qaida. This 
admission is an initial indication that Obama understands the need to 
subordinate military endeavors to his political objectives. It also shows 
his grasp of the context in which he is operating, with respect to both his 
domestic audience and the strategic geopolitical context in which he leads 
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and operates. Time will tell whether he is able to bring his grand strategic 
plans to fruition as it relates to economic recovery, an overhauled health 
care plan, climate change, gaining international momentum toward 
nuclear zero, bringing American involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan to a 
successful, timely, and stable close, and protecting the homeland from 
further terrorist attacks. As he attempts to do so, he will undoubtedly face 
many more challenges. And, as he navigates these, Obama will do well to 
apply the universal principles of grand strategy and Clausewitzian and 
indirect approaches wherever possible.
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